Purpose – To review and discuss Luciano Floridi’s 2019 book The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design, the latest instalment in his philosophy of information (PI) tetralogy, particularly with respect to its implications for library and information studies (LIS). Design/methodology/approach – Nine scholars with research interests in philosophy and LIS read and responded to the book, raising critical and heuristic questions in the spirit of scholarly dialogue. Floridi responded to these questions. Findings – Floridi’s PI, including (...) this latest publication, is of interest to LIS scholars, and much insight can be gained by exploring this connection. It seems also that LIS has the potential to contribute to PI’s further development in some respects. Research implications – Floridi’s PI work is technical philosophy for which many LIS scholars do not have the training or patience to engage with, yet doing so is rewarding. This suggests a role for translational work between philosophy and LIS. Originality/value – The book symposium format, not yet seen in LIS, provides forum for sustained, multifaceted and generative dialogue around ideas. (shrink)

Review and response to Gimbel’s Isn’t That Clever.

Kevin McCain’s Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification is the most thorough defense of evidentialism to date. In this work, McCain proposes insightful new theses to fill in underdeveloped parts of evidentialism. One of these new theses is an explanationist account of evidential fit that appeals to dispositional properties. We argue that this explanationist account faces counterexamples, and that, more generally, explanationists should not understand evidential fit in terms of dispositional properties.

Humility is a paradoxical virtue. This should come as no great surprise. It doesn’t take much explanation for one to realize that if someone is boasting about how humble he is, then he probably is not humble. In fact, as we shall see, the paradoxical nature of humility has a long history, going back to at least Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. While it may not be a novel claim that there exists an apparent paradox of humility, I will (...) argue that there is more than one humility paradox, perhaps as many as five: the epistemic paradox, the paradox of self-attribution, the inculcation paradox, the agentic paradox, and the axiological paradox. All these paradoxes are distinct, yet seemingly intertwined. Upon examining them each in turn, we will be left with a Gordian knot of humility paradoxes. (shrink)

A close reading of Mary Robinson’s late-eighteenth-century poem “London’s Summer Morning,” which captures all the noises and smells of a busy London street, is not enough to convince the reader that it isn’t all a dream. But whose dream? René Descartes and Wallace Stevens suggest that it may not matter.

Berkeley doesn't use the Time-Gap Argument, as Leibniz does, to prove either that we immediately see only ideas or that we see physical objects mediately. It may be doubted whether he was even aware of the time-gap problem that gives rise to the argument. But certain passages in the Three Dialogues and elsewhere suggest that Berkeley would have had cogent answers to anyone who claimed that this argument, construed as being in aid of the conclusion that we only perceive ideas, (...) is unsound. Discussing points made by Bertil Belfrage, Len Carrier, John Foster, A. C. Grayling, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Tom Stoneham, and Colin Turbayne, I try to show that the Time-Gap Argument can be expanded into a strong argument for Berkeleian Idealism. I also idnicate how the latter provides a solution to J. J. Valberg's "puzzle of experience" and disarms James Cornman's argument in Perception, Common Sense, and Science that Berkeley, too, faces a time-gap problem. (shrink)

Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem comes in two versions: that no consistent theory which interprets Robinson's Arithmetic (Q) can prove all instances of the T-Scheme and hence define truth; and that no such theory, if sound, can even express truth. In this note, I prove corresponding limitative results for validity. While Peano Arithmetic already has the resources to define a predicate expressing logical validity, as Jeff Ketland has recently pointed out (2012, Validity as a primitive. Analysis 72: 421-30), no (...) theory which interprets Q closed under the standard structural rules can define nor express validity, on pain of triviality. The results put pressure on the widespread view that there is an asymmetry between truth and validity, viz. that while the former cannot be defined within the language, the latter can. I argue that Vann McGee's and Hartry Field's arguments for the asymmetry view are problematic. (shrink)

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals (...) are Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy. (shrink)

JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK. Surprises in logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 253. Some people, not just beginning students, are at first surprised to learn that the proposition “If zero is odd, then zero is not odd” is not self-contradictory. Some people are surprised to find out that there are logically equivalent false universal propositions that have no counterexamples in common, i. e., that no counterexample for one is a counterexample for the other. Some people would be surprised to (...) find out that in normal first-order logic existential import is quite common: some universals “Everything that is S is P” —actually quite a few—imply their corresponding existentials “Something that is S is P”. Anyway, perhaps contrary to its title, this paper is not a cataloging of surprises in logic but rather about the mistakes that did or might have or might still lead people to think that there are no surprises in logic. The paper cataloging of surprises in logic is on our “to-do” list. -/- ► JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK, Surprises in logic. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected] There are many surprises in logic. Peirce gave us a few. Russell gave Frege one. Löwenheim gave Zermelo one. Gödel gave some to Hilbert. Tarski gave us several. When we get a surprise, we are often delighted, puzzled, or skeptical. Sometimes we feel or say “Nice!”, “Wow, I didn’t know that!”, “Is that so?”, or the like. Every surprise belongs to someone. There are no disembodied surprises. Saying there are surprises in logic means that logicians experience surprises doing logic—not that among logical propositions some are intrinsically or objectively “surprising”. The expression “That isn’t surprising” often denigrates logical results. Logicians often aim for surprises. In fact, [1] argues that logic’s potential for surprises helps motivate its study and, indeed, helps justify logic’s existence as a discipline. Besides big surprises that change logicians’ perspectives, the logician’s daily life brings little surprises, e.g. that Gödel’s induction axiom alone implies Robinson’s axiom. Sometimes wild guesses succeed. Sometimes promising ideas fail. Perhaps one of the least surprising things about logic is that it is full of surprises. Against the above is Wittgenstein’s surprising conclusion : “Hence there can never be surprises in logic”. This paper unearths basic mistakes in [2] that might help to explain how Wittgenstein arrived at his false conclusion and why he never caught it. The mistakes include: unawareness that surprise is personal, confusing logicians having certainty with propositions having logical necessity, confusing definitions with criteria, and thinking that facts demonstrate truths. People demonstrate truths using their deductive know-how and their knowledge of facts: facts per se are epistemically inert. [1] JOHN CORCORAN, Hidden consequence and hidden independence. This Bulletin, vol.16, p. 443. [2] LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Kegan Paul, London, 1921. -/-. (shrink)

RESUMO A inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) é uma das biotecnologias de reprodução mais estudadas dos últimos anos, e a busca pelo equilíbrio entre a fisiologia animal e o controle hormonal fomenta uma série de estudos. Sendo assim, o objetivo com este trabalho foi avaliar a eficiência da aplicação do hormônio liberador de gonadotrofinas (GnRH) no dia zero (D0) do protocolo de IATF, a base de estrógeno e progesterona sobre a taxa de penhez por IATF. O experimento foi desenvolvido (...) na Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU), na Fazenda Experimental do Glória, localizada no município de Uberlândia, no estado de Minas Gerais. Foram avaliadas 69 inseminações de vacas leiteiras mestiças, divididas em dois grupos com diferentes protocolos; Controle: sem aplicação de GnRH e Tratamento: aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo. Todos os animais foram inseminados com sêmen previamente analisado. O diagnóstico de gestação foi realizado 32 dias após a inseminação, com aparelho de ultrassonografia equipado com probe linear transretal de 7,5 MHz. Os dados foram analisados por análise descritiva, sendo avaliado o efeito da relação protocolo e presença de corpo lúteo no início do protocolo e efeito da relação protocolo e ordem de IA Pós-Parto sobre a taxa de concepção. A taxa de concepção após a realização do Protocolo Tratamento foi de 53% (17/32) e do Protocolo Controle foi de 43% (16/37). Portanto, conclui-se que o protocolo de sincronização de vacas leiteiras mestiças com a aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo resultou em um aumento no número da taxa de concepção de vacas leiteiras mestiças. Palavras-chave: biotecnologia; bovinocultura; hormônio; ovulação; reprodução. ABSTRACT The artificial insemination at fixed time (AIFT) is one of the most studied reproduction biotechnologies in recent years, and the search for a balance between animal physiology and hormonal control fosters a series of studies. Therefore, the objective of this work was to to evaluate the efficiency of gonadotrofine hormone inducer (GnRH) on day zero (D0) of the AIFT protocol, an estrogen and progesterone base on an AIFT rate. The experiment was developed at the Federal University of Uberlândia (UFU), at the Experimental Farm of Glória, located in the municipality of Uberlândia, in the state of Minas Gerais. Were evaluated 69 inseminations of crossbred dairy cows divided into two groups with different protocols; Control: without application of GnRH and Treatment: application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol. All animals were inseminated with previously analyzed semen. The diagnosis of pregnancy was performed 32 days after insemination, with an ultrasound device equipped with a 7.5 MHz transrectal linear probe. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, evaluating the effect of the protocol relationship and the presence of corpus luteum at the beginning of the protocol and the effect of the protocol relationship and postpartum AI order on the conception rate. The conception rate after performing of the Treatment Protocol was 53% (17/32) and the Control Protocol was 43% (16/37). Therefore, it is concluded that the synchronization protocol of crossbred dairy cows with the application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol resulted in an increase in the number of conception rates of crossbred dairy cows. Keywords: biotechnology; cattle breeding; hormone; ovulation; reproduction. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ATANASOV, A. S.; DINEVA, J. D.; YOTOV, S. A. Ultrasonic evaluation of uterine involution in Bulgarian Murrah buffalo after administration of oxytocin. Animal Reproduction Science, v.133, p.71-76, 2012. BALL, P. J. H.; PETERS, A. R. Reprodução em bovinos. São Paulo – SP. BARBOSA, C. F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 40, p. 79-84, 2011. BARBOSA, C. F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, Viçosa, MG, v. 40, n. 1, pág. 79-84, 2011. BARROS, C. M.; FIGUEIREDO, R. A.; PINHEIRO, O. L. Estro, ovulação e dinâmica folicular em zebuínos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, Belo Horizonte, v.19, p. 9-22, 1995. BARUSELLI, P. S. Controle farmacológico do ciclo estral em ruminantes. Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Departamento de reprodução animal, Universidade de São Paulo, 2000. BARUSELLI, P. S. et al. Review: Using artificial insemination v. natural service in beef herds. Animal, London, v. 12, p. 45-52, 2018. BEG, M. A.; GINTHER, O. J. Follicle selection in cattle and horses: role of intrafollicular factors. Reproduction, v. 132, pag. 365-377, 2006. BERTAN, C. M.; BINELLI, M.; MADUREIRA, E. H. Caracterização do estro de novilhas cruzadas (Bos taurus indicus x Bos taurus taurus) por radiotelemetria. Brazilian Journal of Veterinary Research and Animal Science, São Paulo, v. 43, n. 6, p. 816-823, 2006. BÓ, G. A.; BARUSELLI, P. S.; MARTINEZ, M. F. Pattern and manipulation of follicular development in Bos indicus cattle. Animal Reproduction Science, v.78, p.307-326, 2003. BÓ, G.; CUTAIA, P. S; BARUSELLI. Programas de inseminación artificial y transferencia de embriones a tiempo fijo. In: SIMPÓSIO INTERNACIONAL DE REPRODUÇÃO APLICADA, 1., 2004, Londrina [Trabalhos apresentados] Cornélio Procópio: Geraembryo, 2004. p. 56-81. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 12 nov. 2022. BORGES, A. M. et al. Dinâmica folicular e momento da ovulação em vacas não lactantes das raças Gir e Nelore durante duas estações do ano. Arquivo Brasileiro de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Belo Horizonte, v.56, n.3, p.346-354, 2004. BORGES, A. M. Dinâmica folicular e superovulação em novilhas mestiças tratadas com somatotropina bovina (rBST) e efeito da temperatura na qualidade dos embriões. 1999. Tese de Doutorado. UFV. BURATINI, J. J. Controle endócrino e local da foliculogênese em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal. Belo Horizonte, v.31, n.2, p.190-196, 2007. CALLEJAS, S. S.; FISIOLOGÍA, D. E. L.; CICLO ESTRAL BOVINO. In: Palma GA. Biotecnología de la reproducción. Mar del Plata: Reprobiotec, 2001. p.37-49. CAMPOS, C. C.; SANTOS, R. M. Taxa de concepção e detecção do estro de retorno após a IATF em vacas Holandesas. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, v. 36, n. 3, suplemento 1, p. 1945- 1954, 2015. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022 CARVALHO, B. C. Parâmetros reprodutivos, metabólitos e produção de leite de vacas mestiças Holandês x Zebu submetidas a dois manejos pré-parto. Tese (Doutorado em Medicina Veterinária) - Escola de Veterinária, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, 2009. CASTILHO, E. F. IATF como ferramenta no melhoramento genético de bovinos de leite. In: CASTILHO, E. F. (org.). Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) em bovinos leiteiros. 1. ed. Maringá: IEPEC, 2015. p. 148-191. CHEBEL, R. C. et al. Factors affecting conception rate after artificial insemination and pregnancy loss in lactating dairy cows. Animal Reproduction Science, v.84, p.239-255, 2004. CLIMATE DATA ORG. Clima Uberlândia. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. de 2022. Curso de Transferência de Embriões, Uberlândia: ASBIA, 2021. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Endocrinologia da Reprodução Animal. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro; DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque. Hormônios e Sistema Endócrino na Reprodução Animal. 2020. D’AVILA, C. A. et al. Hormônio utilizados na indução da ovulação em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal. Belo Horizonte, v. 43, n. 4, p. 797-802, out./dez.2019. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 25 de jan. 2022. DEMÉTRIO, D.G.B. et al. Factors affecting conception rates following artificial insemination or embryo transfer in lactating Holstein cows. Journal of Dairy Science, v.90, p.5073-5082, 2007. DUARTE JUNIOR, M. F. et al. Aspectos relacionados a fisiologia do anestro pós parto em bovinos. Colloquium Agrariae, Cuiabá, v.9, p.43-71, 2013. DUKES, H. H.; SWENSON, M. J.; REECE, W. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. 12. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 2006. FERREIRA, A. M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Edição do Autor, 2010. FINK, G. Gonadotropin secretion and its control. In: KNOBIL, E.; NEILL, J. (ed.), The physiology of reproduction. New York: Raven Press, 1988. p. 1349-1377. FOLMAN, Y. et al. Comparison of methods for the synchronization of estrous cycles in dairy cows. 2. Effects of progesterone and parity on conception. Journal of Dairy Science, v.73, p.2817-2825, 1990. FONSECA, F. A. et al. Reproductive traits of Holsteins and Jerseys. Effects of age, milk yield, and clinical abnormalities on involution of cervix and uterus, ovulation, estrous cycles, detection of estrus, conception rate, and days open. Journal of Dairy Science, v.66, p.1128- 1147, 1983. FORTUNE, J. E.; RIVERA, G. M.; YANG, M. Y. Follicular development: the role of the follicular microenvironment in selectionof the dominant follicle. Animal Reproduction Science, v.82-83, p.109-126, 2004. FURTADO, D. A. et al. Inseminação Artificial em Tempo Fixo em Bovinos de Corte. Revista Científica Eletrônica de Medicina Veterinária, n. 16, pag. 25, 2011. GINTHER O. J. et al. Selection of the dominant follicle in cattle. Biology of Reproduction, v.55, p.1187-1194, 1996. GONZÁLEZ, F. H. D. Introdução à endocrinologia reprodutiva veterinária. Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2002. 87p. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 12 dez. 2022. HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Ciclos Reprodutivos. In: HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução Animal, 7. ed. Barueri, SP: Ed. Manole, 2004. cap. 4, p. 55-67. IBGE – INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA. Produção de Leite. IBGE, 2021. LOPES, P. F. R.; RICARDO, P. Y.; LUIZ, C. T. Custos e escala de produção na pecuária leiteira: estudo nos principais estados produtores do Brasil. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 2007. v. 45, n. 3. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. MADUREIRA, E. H. et al. Sincronização com prostágenos. In: I Simpósio Internacional de Reprodução Animal Aplicada. Londrina, Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Universidade de São Paulo, p. 117-128, 2004. MARTEL, C. A. Fertility after timed AI insemination in response to a controlled internal drug release (CIDR) insert in lactating dairy cows. 2008. 48f. Thesis (MS Science) Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, USA. MARTIN, I. et al. Características ultrassonográficas do útero de vacas Nelore (Bos taurus indicus) ao longo do ciclo estral. Veterinária e Zootecnia, Botucatu, v.15, n.2, ago., p. 349- 359, 2008. MIRANDA, J. E.C.; FREITAS, A. F. Raças e tipos de cruzamentos para produção de leite. Juíz de Fora: Embrapa Gado de Leite, 2009. Circular Técnica, 98. 12p. MOREIRA, R. J. C., Uso do protocolo Crestar® em tratamentos utilizando benzoato de estradiol, PGF2α, PMSG e GnRH para controle do ciclo estral e ovulação em vacas de corte. 2002, 62f. Dissertação de Mestrado, Piracicaba, 2003. MOSES, V. S.; BERTONE, A. L. Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. Veterinary Clinics of North America, v.18, p.21-37, 2002. NAKAMURA, T.; SAKAMOTO, K. Reactive oxygen species up-regulates cyclooxygenase2, p53, and Bax mRNA expression in bovine luteal cells. Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications. v.284 p.203-210. 2001. NASSER, L. F. T. Resposta superovulatória na primeira onda de crescimento folicular em doadoras Nelore (Bos taurus indicus). 2006, 80f. Tese (Doutorado) - USP. FMVZ. Departamento de reprodução animal, São Paulo. OLIVEIRA, M. Fisiologia da reprodução bovina e métodos de controle do ciclo estral. 2006. 28 f. Tese (Especialização em Reprodução e Produção de Bovinos) -UNIVERSIDADE CASTELO BRANCO, Rio de Janeiro, 2006. PALHANO, H. B. Reprodução em Bovinos, LF livros de veterinária, 2 edição, 2008, 249p. PONCIO, V. A. P. EFICIÊNCIA DE DOIS PROTOCOLOS DE IATF UTILIZANDO BENZOATO DE ESTRADIOL OU GnRH. Nova Odessa. 2021. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 25 de jan. 2022. PURSLEY, J. R.; MEE, M. O.; WILTBANK, M. C. Synchronization of ovulation in dairy cows using PGF2α and GnRH. Theriogenology, v.44, p.915-923, 1995. REICHENBACH, H. D.; MORAES, J. C. F.; NEVES, J. P. 2008. Tecnologia do sêmen e inseminação artificial em bovinos. In: Gonçalves P. B. D.; Figueiredo J. R. e Freitas V. J. F. Biotécnicas aplicadas à reprodução animal. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ed. Roca. 395 p. ROBINSON, R. S. et al. Corpus luteum-endometriumembryo interactions in the dairy cow: underlying mechanisms and clinical relevance. Reproduction in Domestic Animals, v.43, p.104-12, 2008. Roca, 3ª Edição, 232 p., 2006. RUAS, J. R. M. et al. Vacas F1 Holandês x Zebu: uma opção para sistema de produção de leite em condições tropicais. Inf. Agropec., v.35, p.113-120, 2014. SARTORI, R. Manejo reprodutivo da fêmea leiteira. Reprodução Animal, Belo Horizonte, v.31, n.2, p.153-159, abr./jun. 2007. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. SILVA, A. T. N. et al. Efeito de diferentes estratégias de manejo na distribuição da prenhez em vacas de corte mestiças paridas. In: XVI Congresso Brasileiro de Reprodução Animal. (Goiânia, Brasil). Resumo 158, 2007. SILVA, A.S. et al. Avaliação do custo benefício da inseminação artificial convencional e em tempo fixo de fêmeas bovinas pluríparas de corte. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v.31, n.4, p.443-445, 2007. SOUZA, A. H. et al. Efeitos da gonadotrofina coriônica equina e do tipo de estímulo ovulatório em um protocolo de IA cronometrada sobre as respostas reprodutivas em vacas leiteiras. Teriogenologia, Stoneham, v. 72, n. 1, pág. 10-21, 2009. STABENFELDT, G. H.; EDQVIST, L. E. Processos Reprodutivos da Fêmea. In: SWENSON, M. J.; REECE, W., Dukes Fisiologia dos Animais Domésticos, Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 1996. cap. 36, p. 615-644. VALLE, E. R. O ciclo estral de bovinos e métodos de controle. Campo Grande: EMBRAPA – CNPGC, 1991. 24p. (EMBRAPA-CNPGC. Documentos, 48). VISHWANATH, R. Artificial insemination: the state of the art. Theriogenology, v.59, p.571- 584, 2003. WOLFENSON, D. et al. The effect of a GnRH analogue on the dynamics of follicular development and synchronization of estrus in lactating cyclic dairy cows. Theriogenology, v.42, p.633- 644, 1994. YAMADA, K. Desenvolvimento da sincronização da ovulação e inseminação artificial em tempo fixo em vacas leiteiras. Jornal de Reprodução e Desenvolvimento, Nagoya, v. 51, n. 2, pág. 177-186, 2005. (shrink)

The incompleteness of set theory ZF C leads one to look for natural nonconservative extensions of ZF C in which one can prove statements independent of ZF C which appear to be “true”. One approach has been to add large cardinal axioms.Or, one can investigate second-order expansions like Kelley-Morse class theory, KM or Tarski-Grothendieck set theory T G or It is a nonconservative extension of ZF C and is obtained from other axiomatic set theories by the inclusion of Tarski’s axiom (...) which implies the existence of inaccessible cardinals. See also related set theory with a filter quantifier ZF (aa). In this paper we look at a set theory NC# ∞# , based on bivalent gyper infinitary logic with restricted Modus Ponens Rule In this paper we deal with set theory NC# ∞# based on bivalent gyper infinitary logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule. Nonconservative extensions of the canonical internal set theories IST and HST are proposed. (shrink)

According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones (...) can be found, Excluders can escape them. (shrink)

This précis summarizes the main topics, arguments and conclusions of the book. Many interesting arguments and critiques have, of course, been omitted in order to make this summary appropriately brief.

The concept of expression in the arts is Janus-faced. On the one hand expression is an author-centered notion: many Romantic poets, painters, and musicians thought of themselves as pouring our or ex-pressing their own emotions in their artworks. And on the other hand, expression is an audience-centered notion, the communication of what is expressed by an author to members of an audience. Typically the word “expression” is used for the author-centered aspect of expression as a whole, and the word “expressiveness” (...) is used for the audience-centered aspect, and I shall keep to this usage. In this paper I shall argue that although expression is closely related to expressiveness, the two concepts are distinct and, in particular, expressiveness cannot be analyzed in terms of expression, as has been recently suggested by Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson. Nonetheless, the richest examples of expression in the arts involve both expression and expressiveness. (shrink)

This article focuses on the positive reasons for adopting epiphenomenalism. Some objections that have been answered in more detail in my other work receive some response here, but the main point is to see why epiphenomenalism is an attractive view for those with a generally naturalistic outlook. It distinguishes qualitative events from propositional states and explains why their treatment must be different. The view that our words must 'express our thoughts' is critically examined.

Gossip is rarely praised. There seems little virtuous that is about talking behind someone’s back. Whether there is anything virtuous about gossip, however, depends on the kind of gossip. Some gossip is idle, but some evaluative gossip promulgates and enforces norms. When properly motivated, such gossip effects positive change in society and counts as gossiping well. The virtue of gossiping well even includes some kinds of false gossip, namely the sort that exaggerates a pre-existing trait, thereby creating a caricature of (...) a person’s character in order to establish a moral exemplar (or anti-exemplar). (shrink)

Virtues are acquirable, so if intellectual humility is a virtue, it’s acquirable. But there is something deeply problematic—perhaps even paradoxical—about aiming to be intellectually humble. Drawing on Edward Slingerland’s analysis of the paradoxical virtue of wu-wei in Trying Not To Try (New York: Crown, 2014), we argue for an anti-individualistic conception of the trait, concluding that one’s intellectual humility depends upon the intellectual humility of others. Slingerland defines wu-wei as the “dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious state of mind of a person (...) who is optimally active and effective” (Trying Not to Try, 7). Someone who embodies wu-wei inspires implicit trust, so it is beneficial to appear wu-wei. This has led to an arms race between faking wu-wei on the one hand and detecting fakery on the other. Likewise, there are many benefits to being (or seeming to be) intellectually humble. But someone who makes conscious, strategic efforts to appear intellectually humble is ipso facto not intellectually humble. Following Slingerland’s lead, we argue that there are several strategies one might pursue to acquire genuine intellectual humility, and all of these involve commitment to shared social or epistemic values, combined with receptivity to feedback from others, who must in turn have and manifest relevant intellectual virtues. In other words, other people and shared values are partial bearers of a given individual’s intellectual humility. If this is on the right track, then acquiring intellectual humility demands epistemic anti-individualism. (shrink)

The term “environmental justice” carries with it a sort of ambiguity. On the one hand, it refers to a movement of social activism in which those involved fight and argue for fairer, more equitable distribution of environmental goods and equal treatment of environmental duties. This movement is related to, and ideally informed by, the second use of the term, which refers to the academic discipline associated with legal regulations and theories of justice and ethics with regard to sustainability, the environment, (...) and ecology. It is this latter, more academic—though vast and interdisciplinary—use of the term that is the subject of this essay. However, activists who pay careful attention to the arguments offered with regard to the political, legal, social, and philosophical treatments of these issues are potentially in a stronger position with regard to their own social movement. In that way, the two uses of the term may progress hand in hand. More broadly, however, the foundational claim about which both grassroots activists and legal, ethical, and policy advocates can agree is that environmental burdens—climate change, pollution, and their associated health risks—are borne disproportionately by the poorest and most vulnerable populations, and tend to have the greatest impact on racial and ethnic minorities, no matter where they are in the world. This is what makes the empirical questions about the environment a normative question about justice. (shrink)

After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly substantive but false, and explore (...) an interesting intermediate possibility which might if developed yield a plausibly true yet not-entirely-trivial version of the doctrine: it is equivalent to what I call "the Denial of Bare Distinctness". (shrink)

This paper argues that naturalistic philosophy does not meet its own empiricist mandate. It argues from an empiricist perspective. Naturalists either claim that philosophy is like science in significant ways, or they claim that philosophy ought to be like science. This paper, being chiefly focused on the former claim, argues that naturalistic philosophy is nothing like science. Using Papineau’s markers for the similarities between naturalistic philosophy and science, I argue, counter Papineau, that the method employed in naturalistic philosophy is not (...) a posteriori and its claims are certainly not synthetic in the same way as that of science. This methodological distinction between science and philosophy is one made by Carnap. To show how the methods are distinct I compare two papers; I compare the method employed by Andy Clark in his philosophical paper on the brain as a prediction error minimisation machine with that employed by Rees and Haynes in their neuroscientific paper on mental content. (shrink)

I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...) that candidate entities for re-identification by means we take for granted in the case of persons cannot be what I call "mentalistically" individuated. (shrink)

Robert Nozick (1993) has offered an evolutionary account of self-evident beliefs that comes into conflict with a "mild realist" (Dennett, 1991a) view of beliefs. This chapter summarizes both views, and explains the conflict. Emergence is examined. Mild realism is found to embrace "emergence" in an acceptable sense, and to eschew it in its problematic sense. Nozick's cases of self-evident beliefs are examined and difficulties in his account are explained. An alternative approach is developed that avoids the difficulties in Nozick's account (...) and is compatible with mild realism. Implications of mild realism for concepts are drawn. (shrink)

I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.

Recent findings in experimental philosophy have revealed that people attribute intentionality, belief, desire, knowledge, and blame asymmetrically to side- effects depending on whether the agent who produces the side-effect violates or adheres to a norm. Although the original (and still common) test for this effect involved a chairman helping or harming the environment, hardly any of these findings have been applied to business ethics. We review what little exploration of the implications for business ethics has been done. Then, we present (...) new experimental results that expand the attribution asymmetry to virtue and vice. We also examine whether it matters to people that an effect was produced as a primary or side- effect, as well as how consumer habits might be affected by this phenomenon. These results lead to the conclusion that it appears to be in a businessperson’s self-interest to be virtuous. (shrink)

Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...) judgments. Such a conclusion could be staved off if it could be held that a sufficient condition for commonality of cognitive content in moral judgments could consist, despite the presence of radical moral disagreement, in the parties’acceptance of a common set of fundamental moral principles. Part 1 begins, and Part 2 further develops, a destructive critique of that idea, leading thereby to a skeptical appraisal of the important role sometimes assigned, in metaethical theorizing, to moral rules. Inter alia the paper is intended to suggest the possibility of overlap between relativist and particularist agendas. (shrink)

Tort law depends on three key concepts: causation, responsibility, and fault. However, I argue that the three key concepts are neither necessary, nor sufficient, for tort.

Abstract: In Chapter 4 of his "Self-Deception Unmasked" (SDU), Al Mele considers several (attempted) empirical demonstrations of self-deception. These empirical demonstrations work under the conception of what Mele refers to as the 'dual-belief requirement', in which an agent simultaneously holds a belief p and a belief ~p. Toward the end of this chapter, Mele considers the argument of one biologist and anthropologist, Robert Trivers, who describes what he takes to be an evolutionary explanation for coming to form false beliefs. Mele (...) argues briefly that Trivers's account is no more explanatory than a similar one that does not include the dual-belief requirement. I present a case describing Trivers' analysis, show how Mele might reply to it. After briefly explaining Mele's sufficient conditions for entering self-deception from Chapter 3 of SDU, I'll consider what it means to hold the dual-belief. I'll then consider what I take to be a class of cases of self-deception which rely on genetic determinism, which I take to satisfy the dual-belief condition. (shrink)

Abstract: Receptivity is a foundational concept in the analysis of causation given in Gregg Rosenberg’s A Place for Consciousness and it enters, directly or indirectly, into the definitions of a host of other terms in the book. This commentary raises a problem (which I call “the triviality problem”) about how we are to understand receptivity. Search for a solution proceeds by examination of several contexts in which the concept of receptivity is used. Although a satisfactory solution remains elusive, it is (...) hoped that making the problem clear will lead to its eventual resolution. (shrink)

Summary: Throughout the history of science, indeed throughout the history of knowledge, unification has been touted as a central aim of intellectual inquiry. We’ve always wanted to discover not only numerous bare facts about the universe, but to show how such facts are linked and interrelated. Large amounts of time and effort have been spent trying to show diverse arrays of things can be seen as different manifestations of some common underlying entities or properties. Thales is said to have originated (...) philosophy and science with his declaration that everything was, at base, a form of water. Plato’s theory of the forms was thought to be a magnificent accomplishment because it gave a unified solution to the separate problems of the relation between knowledge and belief, the grounding of objective values, and how continuity is possible amid change. Pasteur made numerous medical advancements possible by demonstrating the interconnection between microorganisms and human disease symptoms. Many technological advances were aided by Maxwell’s showing that light is a kind of electromagnetic radiation. The attempt to unify the various known forces is often referred to as “The Holy Grail” of physics. Some philosophers have even suggested that providing explanations is itself just a sort of unifying of our knowledge. But while unification (like simplicity) has often been hailed as a tremendous virtue in science, the meaning of the term is not altogether clear. Scientists often don’t specify what, precisely, they mean by unification. And in cases where what they mean is clear, different thinkers plainly mean different things by the term. What are the various senses of unification, and why has unification been such an important aim in the history of inquiry? (shrink)

Competitive negotiators frequently use tactics which others view as "unethical", in that these tactics either violate standards of truth telling or violate the perceived rules of negotiation. This paper sought to determine how business students viewed a number of marginally ethical negotiating tactics, and to determine the underlying factor structure of these tactics. The factor analysis of these tactics revealed five clear factors which were highly similar across the two samples, and which parallel (to a moderate degree) categories of tactics (...) proposed by earlier theory. Data from one sample also permitted comparisons of the appropriateness of certain tactics across gender, nationality, ethnic origin and perception of one's negotiating style. (shrink)

Schleiermacher’s Icoses is the first book-length study of the 1813 Academy address “Ueber die verschiedenen Methodes des Uebersetzens”; in addition to celebrating its 200 years of influence, the book undertakes a comprehensive examination of the whole argument, from its theory of hermeneutics to its foreignizing theory of translation and all the passing “poetic” elements on which Schleiermacher’s rhetoric always so heavily relied. The “icoses” in the title are specifically an articulation of the Gefühle/feelings that lie at the heart of Schleiermacher’s (...) hermeneutics—specifically, his insistence that feelings are shaped by society, and so seem “objective” or “universal,” but are experienced inwardly by each individual, so that they seem “subjective” and “private.” Research-based “feeling one’s way into an author” is guided by culture, and is therefore not, pace certain twentieth-century hermeneutical philosophers, mystical but “icotic.” -/- TESTIMONIA -/- Robinson's intriguing study of Schleiermacher's 1813 Academy address "On the Different Methods of Translating," which grew out of an article commemorating its bicentennial, is the first book-length commentary on the address. Robinson works meticulously through the entire text, both the German original and his own English translation, exposing its logical and other argumentative flaws mercilessly, but in order not to attack or dismiss it, rather to show that logic is not the right interpretive lens through which to view Schleiermacher's project. The right lens, Robinson suggests, is what he calls "icoses": social ecologies that shape our thought and convictions as members of a social group. The result is a fresh look at Schleiermacher's address and the hermeneutics that inform it, and one that generates surprising new insights into foreignization, feeling-based hermeneutics, and the Romantic ethos of estrangement. (Radegundis Stolze, Technische Universität Darmstadt) -/- Robinson's reading of Schleiermacher deals in detail with the whole address, and more, bringing out numerous problems that have remained hidden, dormant, and should be discussed. It provocatively picks up what any close reader feels: Schleiermacher's is not a highly coherent account of translation -­ it got some things right but left many gaps and contradictions. Robinson's inquiry suggests how the unresolved problems might be approached in an unexpected way: by a hermeneutic blurring of distinctions between the subjective and the objective, the psychological and the linguistic, the individual and the social. (Anthony Pym, Professor of Translation and Intercultural Studies Rovira i Virgili University, Visiting Professor Monterey Institute of International Studies). (shrink)

Gossip is often serious business, not idle chitchat. Gossip allows those oppressed to privately name their oppressors as a warning to others. Of course, gossip can be in error. The speaker may be lying or merely have lacked sufficient evidence. Bias can also make those who hear the gossip more or less likely to believe the gossip. By examining the social functions of gossip and considering the differences in power dynamics in which gossip can occur, we contend that gossip may (...) be not only permissible but virtuous, both as the only reasonable recourse available and as a means of resistance against oppression. (shrink)

Kit Fine (2000) breaks with tradition, arguing that, pace Russell (e.g., 1903: 228), relations have neither directions nor converses. He considers two ways to conceive of these new "neutral" relations, positionalism and anti-positionalism, and argues that the latter should be preferred to the former. Cody Gilmore (2013) argues for a generalization of positionalism, slot theory, the view that a property or relation is n-adic if and only if there are exactly n slots in it, and (very roughly) that each slot (...) may be occupied by at most one entity. Slot theory (and with it, positionalism) bears the full brunt of Fine's (2000) symmetric completions and conflicting adicities problems. I fully develop an alternative, plural slot theory (or pocket theory), which avoids these problems, key elements of which are first considered by Yi (1999: 168 ff.). Like the slot theorist, the pocket theorist posits entities (pockets) in properties and relations that can be occupied. But unlike the slot theorist, the pocket theorist denies that at most one entity can occupy any one of them. As a result, she must also deny that the adicity of a property or relation is equal to the number of occupiable entities in it. By abandoning these theses, however, the pocket theorist is able to avoid Fine's problems, resulting in a stronger theory about the internal structure of properties and relations. Pocket theory also avoids a serious drawback of anti-positionalism. (shrink)

Intellectual humility is an interesting but underexplored disposition. The claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humility’. We present a thesaurus-based method to map the semantic space (...) of intellectual humility as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological analysis of this disposition. We find three semantic clusters that compose intellectual humility: the sensible self, the discreet self, and the inquisitive self; likewise, we find three clusters that compose its contraries: the overrated self, the underrated other, and the underrated self. (shrink)

A linguistic convention is a principle or norm that has been adopted by a person or linguistic community about how to use, and therefore what the meaning is of, a specific term. Examples of such norms or principles are those expressed by propositions that express the laws of logic or those that express implicit definitions. Arguments about the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, very broadly, fall into two camps: the one holds that the basis of linguistic conventions is objective and (...) that, therefore, such conventions are genuinely truth-bearing. Knowledge of such conventions is therefore knowledge of the objective truth of such conventions. This camp might be labelled ‘realist’. The other holds that there is no known basis to linguistic conventions and that conventions are, to the best of our knowledge, not objective, but invented. Their truth is stipulated by the relevant speaker or linguistic community. Such truth is, consequently, trivial and knowledge of such conventions simply knowledge of the stipulation. This camp might be labelled ‘anti-realist’. These are three standard accounts of the epistemic status of linguistic conventions, which all play into the first camp: (1) knowledge by intuition, (2) inferential a priori knowledge and (3) a posteriori knowledge. I give reasons why these accounts should be rejected. I then argue that linguistic conventions, if conceived of as trivial truths, are knowable non-inferentially a priori. Such an epistemic account provides support for the second camp. In this regard, I marshal support from some recent work by Wright and Hale. (shrink)

Experiential acquaintance is an alleged relation between ourselves and our experiences that has sometimes been hypothesised as necessary for knowledge of our experiences. This paper begins with a clarification of ‘acquaintance’ and an explanation of ‘experience’ that focuses attention on a famous, but flawed, argument by G. E. Moore. It goes on to critically examine several recent arguments concerning experiential acquaintance and to show how internalist foundationalism can respond to a famous Sellarsian dilemma without appeal to a relation of acquaintance (...) with our experiences. It concludes that we can dispense with experiential acquaintance. (shrink)

I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead to interesting reflections on (...) the nature of definition, on the conditions for possessing the property of necessary existence and point towards a different, neo-Platonic ground for God’s meeting the criteria for being logically necessary. (shrink)

We advance the understanding of the philosophy and psychology of curiosity by operationalizing and constructing an empirical measure of Nietzsche’s conception of inquisitive curiosity, expressed by the German term Wissbegier, (“thirst for knowledge” or “need/impetus to know”) and Neugier (“curiosity” or “inquisitiveness”). First, we show that existing empirical measures of curiosity do not tap the construct of inquisitive curiosity, though they may tap related constructs such as idle curiosity and phenomenological curiosity. Next, we map the concept of inquisitive curiosity and (...) connect it to related concepts, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility. The bulk of the paper reports four studies: an Anglophone exploratory factor analysis, an Anglophone confirmatory factor analysis, an informant study, and a Germanophone exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. (shrink)

Can the issue of how important it is whether or not there is a God be decided prior to deciding whether or not there is a God? In this paper, I explore some difficulties that stand in the way of answering this question in the affirmative and some of the implications of these difficulties for that part of the Philosophy of Religion which concerns itself with assessing arguments for and against the existence of God, the implications for how its importance (...) may best be defended within secular academe. (shrink)

Receptivity is a foundational concept in the analysis of causation given in Gregg Rosenberg’s A Place for Consciousness and it enters, directly or indirectly, into the definitions of a host of other terms in the book. This commentary raises a problem about how we are to understand receptivity. Search for a solution proceeds by examination of several contexts in which the concept of receptivity is used. Although a satisfactory solution remains elusive, it is hoped that making the problem clear will (...) lead to its eventual resolution. (shrink)

I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be dubbed ”creativity’ or ”imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it ascribes to the self these three ”features’ or ”moments’ and they bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo- platonic, Augustinian tradition.

A number of philosophers think that grounding is, in some sense, well-founded. This thesis, however, is not always articulated precisely, nor is there a consensus in the literature as to how it should be characterized. In what follows, I consider several principles that one might have in mind when asserting that grounding is well-founded, and I argue that one of these principles, which I call ‘full foundations’, best captures the relevant claim. My argument is by the process of elimination. For (...) each of the inadequate principles, I illustrate its inadequacy by showing either that it excludes cases that should not be ruled out by a well-foundedness axiom for grounding, or that it admits cases that should be ruled out. (shrink)

Can an ugly experiment be a good experiment? Philosophers have identified many beautiful experiments and explored ways in which their beauty might be connected to their epistemic value. In contrast, the present chapter seeks out (and celebrates) ugly experiments. Among the ugliest are those being designed by AI algorithms. Interestingly, in the contexts where such experiments tend to be deployed, low aesthetic value correlates with high epistemic value. In other words, ugly experiments can be good. Given this, we should conclude (...) that beauty is not generally necessary or sufficient for epistemic value, and increasing beauty will not generally tend to increase epistemic value. (shrink)

Review of Scott Jordan , ‘Modeling Consciousness Across The Disciplines'.

This is a concordance of page numbers in the following editions of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: English editions prior to the Routledge Classics 2002; Routledge Classics edition, with the new pagination; the French edition from Gallimard, prior to 2005; the 2e edition from Gallimard, 2005, with new pagination.

One of the main contentions of the framework for Responsible Innovation (RI) is that social and ethical aspects have to be addressed by deliberative engagement with stakeholders and the wider public throughout the innovation process. The aim of this article is to reflect on the question to what extent is deliberative engagement suitable for conducting RI in business. We discuss several tensions that arise when this framework is applied in the business context. Further, we analyse the place of deliberative engagement (...) in several theories of business ethics. We conclude that there remains a tension between the ideal of RI and the way in which the competitive market operates. Hence, RI scholars should reflect more critically on changes that are required in the market in order to make RI possible, modify the ideal of deliberative engagement for RI in business, or attempt to strike a balance between these two responses. (shrink)

The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate (...) final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo". (shrink)

Intellectual humility can be broadly construed as being conscious of the limits of one’s existing knowledge and capable to acquire more knowledge, which makes it a key virtue of the information age. However, the claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker ex- presses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual (...) humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humili- ty’. We present a thesaurus-based methodology to map the semantic space of intellectual hu- mility and the vices it opposes as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological anal- ysis of this disposition. We performed the mapping both in English and German in order to test for possible cultural differences in the understanding of intellectual humility. In both lan- guages, we find basically the same three semantic dimensions of intellectual humility (sensi- bility, discreetness, and knowledge dimensions) as well as three dimensions of its related vic- es (self-overrating, other-underrating and dogmatism dimensions). The resulting semantic clusters were validated in an empirical study with English (n=276) and German (n=406) par- ticipants. We find medium to high correlations (0.54-0.72) between thesaurus similarity and perceived similarity, and we can validate the labels of the three dimensions identified in the study. But we also find indications of the limitations of the thesaurus methodology in terms of cluster plausibility. We conclude by discussing the importance of these findings for construct- ing psychometric scales for intellectual humility. (shrink)